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During October 2002, Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, published 
Sea Power 21, which established the cornerstone for current naval planning and 
preparation for future operations. Basically serving as the Navy’s vision statement of how 
it plans to “organize, integrate and transform” itself to meet the asymmetrical threats of 
the 21st century, Sea Power 21 is highlighted by Admiral Clark’s redefinition of the three 
fundamental operational concepts which will transform the U.S. Navy: Sea Shield, Sea 
Strike and Sea Basing. In order to accomplish this three-pronged operational 
transformation, Admiral Clark envisioned a “triad of organizational processes” 
incorporated to “align and accelerate the development of enhanced warfighting 
capabilities for the fleet.” One of these organizational processes is Sea Enterprise, which 
tasked the Vice Chief of Naval Operations to “improve organizational alignment, refine 
requirements, and reinvest savings to buy the platforms and systems needed to transform” 
the U.S. Navy.  
As part of Sea Enterprise, the Navy sought to produce measured reductions in its 
active duty end strength through Fiscal Year (FY) 2007. These calculated cuts in 
personnel were designed as a cost savings initiative in an attempt to reinvest in 
warfighting capital while taking advantage of enhanced technical capabilities realized 
through the acquisition of integrated information systems and the organizational 
realignment of some of its core competencies. Since FY2003, the Navy has been able to 
cull 16,335 sailors from its rolls with an additional reduction of 20,600 sailors planned 
through FY2007. Although the Navy did not utilize any form of voluntary separation 
incentive to achieve their FY2004/2005 goals, the Department of the Navy (DoN) had 
budgeted for the use of “Force Shaping Tools” to release 914 officers and 781 enlisted 
sailors (DoN, 2005) during FY2006 with the same number being dropped, again, in 
FY2007 to meet its manpower goals. With the publication of the Department of the Navy 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Budget Estimate Submission (DoN, 2006), these numbers were 
further reduced to include only the voluntary separation of 502 officers during FY2006 
under the Targeted Separation Incentive program.  
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In order to facilitate the planned reductions in end strength for the Navy, as well 
as similar reductions for the U.S. Air Force, the FY2006 National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) granted Voluntary Separation Pay Authority to the Secretary of Defense for 
a period from 1 October 2005 through 31 December 2011. Much like past attempts to 
shape the force, the 2006 NDAA authorizes each Department Secretary to offer voluntary 
separation incentives in the form of a lump-sum buyout to its service members, an 
annuity, an annuity/lump sum combination, or selective early retirement for officers with 
more than 15 years of service in order to shape the force. In addition, the FY2006 NDAA 
laid the groundwork for establishing “high year tenure” limits for targeted officer skill 
groups below the current statutory retirement limits (HR 1815, 2006) to further enable the 
services to redefine their manpower needs.    
Although past voluntary separation incentive programs yielded the desired cuts in 
active end strength, numerous studies (which will be discussed in the following chapters) 
concluded that the government had absorbed sizeable losses in the form of economic 
rents that were paid to eligible service members who would have voluntarily left the 
service for a lesser amount than what their particular service was offering (Asch and 
Warner, 2001). In the absence of a more efficient system, these surpluses paid to 
departing service members would have been necessary in order to achieve the desired 
effect of meeting reduction goals in the form of desired separations and can simply be 
viewed as the “cost of doing business” associated with “fairness” on the part of the 
government. During the relatively peaceful nineties, this was a plausible strategy; 
however, as the Global War on Terrorism looks over the horizon at potential adversaries 
in a Hamas-led Palestinian State and a nuclear Iran, the “fairness” factor can not be 
overlooked as the services drive to maintain adequate manning levels while the public 
continues to scrutinize how the defense dollar is spent.  
B. PURPOSE 
Keeping the taxpayer in mind, the purpose of this research is to examine how the 
Targeted Separation Incentive Program, currently underway by the Navy, is being 
administered to bring about the voluntary separations of junior officers in order to meet 
the requirements of the Navy’s most recent force reduction. This study will evaluate the 
effects of past separation incentive programs as well as the current compensation package 
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that the service-member may receive which is outlined in the Fiscal Year 2006 National 
Defense Authorization Act. Next, this thesis will conduct an analysis of the costs 
associated with retaining the service-member versus the personal costs of that individual 
leaving. The objective is to evaluate the Department of the Navy’s (DoN) Targeted 
Separation Incentive Program in order to see if this program can adequately meet the 
goals of the current force reduction and whether or not savings can be realized through 
alternative separation programs. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
During February 2006, the Department of the Navy programmed $28.5 million to 
separate 502 junior officers with six to 12 years of service through the Targeted 
Separation Incentive program (DoN, 2006). Although some may argue the rationale for 
paying people to leave the service during times of war, it is absolutely essential for the 
continued success of future force shaping programs that the Navy defines the true costs 
associated with the Targeted Separation Incentive program. For this reason, this thesis 
will focus on the following questions. 
1. Primary Questions 
Did the Navy adequately fund for the voluntary separation of junior officers 
through the Targeted Separation Incentive program during Fiscal Year (FY) 2006?   
What is the maximum cost the Navy should offer to separating officers through 
the Targeted Separation Incentive (TSI) Program? 
What is the minimum amount that junior officers would be willing to accept 
through this program and what would be the Navy’s net savings as a result of the TSI 
program?  
2. Secondary Questions 
How have past voluntary separations programs worked and what are the concerns 
associated with using each of these programs? 
Can the allocation of separation payments to junior officer be more efficiently 




D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
Using data gathered from the Department of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2006 Budget 
Estimates, as well as past research on the voluntary separation incentive programs 
associated with the last major drawdown, this thesis will focus on the most likely target 
population of the Targeted Separation Incentive program: Navy Lieutenants (O-3) with 
six to 10 years of service.  During the course of this analysis, the discount rates associated 
with reducing the force through separations pay will be examined as well as the range of 
offers the Navy should offer followed by the range of prices the sailor is most likely to 
take. This analysis will be based on current FY2006 pay rates and will conclude with a 
set of recommendations for the administration of future reductions in force by the 
Department of the Navy.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
Using the parameters laid out in the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act 
and the FY2006 Department of the Navy, a model was created to evaluate the net present 
value of the Department of the Navy’s current voluntary separation incentive program as 
it applies to the Navy and its sailors in terms of years of service, projected retirement 
benefits and the expected return on investment from the Department of the Navy. This 
model will use a discount rate used in similar research (Reppert, 2004) in order to provide 
a baseline analysis of this program which will be followed by a pointed explanation of 
how auction theory can be applied to eliminate inefficiencies within the current system. 
In addition, further analysis will be offered on the Navy’s current strategy of reduced 
accessions to meet reduction goals and its impact on future readiness.  
F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II takes a look at past voluntary separation incentive programs and their 
realized effects. In addition, this chapter provides an overview of some of the calculations 
involved in past efforts as well as the strengths and weaknesses associated with each 
attempt. 
Chapter III analyzes the Targeted Separation Incentive program and the potential 
effects this force shaping tools may have on future readiness. This chapter also offers a 
net present value model of what DoN has established in the FY2006 Budget Estimates 
(DoN, 2006) in the form of voluntary separation incentives. 
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Chapter IV presents the Excel model with Crystal Ball add-in used in this 
research to determine the present value of foregone retirement benefits. This chapter also 
covers the assumptions that were made in this model as well as their potential effects the 
execution of the Targeted Separation Incentive program. 
Chapter V provides the data analysis and interpretation of results from the Monte 
Carlo simulations described in Chapter IV. This chapter focuses on the effects that 
different discount rates and assumptions have on the volume of surplus payments made to 
departing officers under the Targeted Separation Incentive program. 
Chapter VI offers an alternative means to conduct voluntary separations through 
the use of auctions. This chapter offers a basic overview of auction theory and provides 
insight into how loss in the form of economic rents paid to departing sailors can be 
reduced through auctions as well as the possibility of gaining useful data relating to the 
true discount rates of separating officers plus additional demographical data associated 
with administering such programs.  
Chapter VII focuses on additional items to be considered when calling on force 
reductions and offers recommendations for future courses of study as DoD, no doubt, 


























II. THE HISTORY OF VOLUNTARY SEPARATION 
INCENTIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 1973, under the direction of President Richard Nixon, Congress 
followed the recommendations of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer 
Armed Force and allowed the authority for the conscription of U.S. service-members to 
lapse, thus laying the foundation for today’s All-Volunteer Force. Seen as an 
“economically viable and potentially more effective” (Bush, 2003) means to meet our 
manpower needs, the All-Volunteer Force shifted our nation’s reliance on an easily 
accessible stream of accessions and created a dependence on our ability to compete with 
market forces to attain active end strength. Since that date, the Department of Defense 
has been dependent on catering to the sensitivities of the labor market associated with 
recruiting and retaining sufficient numbers to maintain its operational needs. 
For this reason, when faced with the prospect of reducing the force, the 
Department of Defense has had to weigh heavily the long term effects of separating 
specific cohorts of officers and enlisted personnel as they pertain to future manpower 
needs. This became very evident during the last major defense drawdown, when the 
active duty officer population was reduced by 23 percent from 1989 through 1996 (CBO, 
1999). In order to meet the demands of a post-Cold War military climate combined with 
the need to work within tighter budgetary constraints, the military realized that it would 
need to offer voluntary separation incentive payments to meet its reduction goals while 
preserving the incentive for others to stay and maintain adequate manning levels required 
to source its warfighting needs.       
B. OVERVIEW OF PAST SEPARATION INCENTIVES 
Throughout the history of the United States, the size and mix of our armed forces 
has always been tailored to meet the perceived and emerging threats to our national 
security. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War during 
the late 1980’s, the United States no longer felt the need to source an active duty military 
large enough to fight two regional conflicts, including one involving a robust, Soviet-led 
Warsaw Pact. During this period, many felt that future conflicts would require a smaller, 
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more technical force, which was further reinforced by the overwhelming success of 
Operations Desert Shield (1990) and Desert Storm (1991).  To transform the military of 
the early 1990’s to a more technical, competency-based organization, Congress and the 
Department of Defense sought to reinvest in military capital through savings realized by 
reducing active duty end strength. This marked the beginning of the first major military 
drawdown involving the All-Volunteer Force.  
Signed into law by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 
and 1993, the Department of Defense was required to reduce the active end strength of 
our armed forces 15% by the end of Fiscal Year 1995. Faced with the challenge of 
bringing in enough personnel “to maintain a combat-ready force in the future and yet 
keep the faith with personnel already in uniform (CBO, 1999),” the FY1992 National 
Defense Authorization Act authorized the use of voluntary separation incentive payments 
to balance the requirements of the force reduction with the expectations of those who did 
not wish to leave. This was executed using three different options to achieve voluntary 
separations: the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI), the Special Separation Benefit 
(SSB) and the Temporary Early Retirement Act (TERA).  
1. Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) 
Although the Department of the Navy initially planned to meet DoD’s force 
reduction requirements through Selective Early Retirement boards (boards designed to 
separate retirement-eligible officers on active duty prior to their intended retirement 
dates), cuts in accessions and the up-or-out policies of the promotion system (CBO, 
1999), the need to cut more than 13,000 officers from 1989 through 1995 left them 
searching for more equitable and expedient means. For those not senior enough to accept 
early retirement, the option with the highest net present value of the three programs was 
the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI). The VSI was basically an annuity determined 
by the following formula:  
VSI annuity = .025 * years of service * final month’s basic pay * 12 months 
This annuity would be paid for a period determined by two times the number of 
years served and would be paid in annual installments on the anniversary of the 
separation date. Separating officers would receive no in-kind benefits and be required to 
serve an additional number of years equivalent to the life of the annuity in a Ready 
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Reserve capacity following separation. Like the other two options, the VSI program was 
only open to service members with more than six but less than 20 years of active service, 
who had just completed five years of continuous service and were not currently in the 
process of being involuntarily separated or reviewed for a possible disability.   
2. Special Separation Benefit 
Despite being significantly lower in value when comparing the present values of 
the three voluntary separations options, the weapon of choice for most Navy officers 
during this timeframe was the Special Separation Benefit (SSB) (see Table 1 below: 
Rogge, 2006). Unlike the VSI program, the separating officer only had a three year 
obligation with the Ready Reserve and received a single payment upon the date of 
separation plus six months of in-kind benefits. The SSB payment was based on the 
following equation: 
SSB = 0.15 * years of service * final month’s basic pay * 12 months 
This lump sum payment was equivalent to the present value of the VSI at a 16% 
personal discount rate. This personal discount rate was the breakeven point for the 
present values of the VSI and SSB programs identified in the Warner and Pleeter study 
(Warner and Pleeter).  The SSB yielded a significantly smaller present value than the VSI 
as the real discount rate declines (Asch and Warner, 2001), leading some to believe that 
the Department of Defense grossly understated the real discount rate required to separate 
13,000 officers during that timeframe. 
 
VSI/SSB Officer Acceptance Figures FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 
Navy    VSI 0 258 392 28 
      SSB 0 432 633 40 
Army    VSI 2064 1180 608 0 
      SSB 2696 1267 754 1 
USAF    VSI 1109 1598 95 0 
      SSB 1233 1123 47 0 
Marine Corps   VSI 10 149 133 0 
      SSB 1 119 66 0 
Department of Defense VSI 3165 3185 1228 28 
     SSB 3930 2941 1500 41 
      Total 4295 6126 2728 69 
        
Source: derived from data obtained from Defense Manpower data center (DMDC) 
Table 1. VSI/SSB Acceptance Figures from Last Drawdown (From: Rogge, 1996) 
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3. Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) 
Not available during the first year of the VSI/SSB program, the Temporary 
Retirement Authority offered an early retirement program to many officers with 15 to 20 
years of service. Due to the involuntary separation constraints placed on officers with 
more than 15 years of service outlined in the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act 
of 1980 (Rostker et al, 1993),  the services found that, as they began to reduce accessions, 
there was a naturally occurring increase in the percentages of field grade officers. In 
order to offset this imbalance, Congress authorized temporary relief through the early 
retirement of field grade officers in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1993. 
Basically offering the same type of lifetime annuity and in-kind benefits 
associated with retirement at 20 years of service, the TERA program was based on a 
monthly calculation determined to account for what the service member would have 
received at twenty years in proportion to the time served on the date of separation (see 
Appendix B). In addition, there were added incentives for the separating member to fill 
needed general service billets, or equivalent jobs working for the federal government in a 
civilian capacity, which would allow that individual to reap full retirement benefits (50%) 
had they served 20 years at the age of 62 (TERA, 2006). 
C. LUMP SUM VERSUS ANNUITIES  
Once the drawdown had been completed, an extensive amount of research was 
conducted to determine which groups were takers for each respective category. Despite 
the fact that the annuity proved to be a wiser long term investment, the majority of 
officers still chose to accept the lump sum SSB payment. Some attributed this apparent 
miscalculation on the part of our departing officers as the government’s failure to 
adequately address the personal discount rates of those wishing to leave the service 
(Rogge, 1996) while, on the other hand, it may have been the fact that lump sum 
payments are simply easier to understand (Hattiangadi, 2001).  
Regardless of the reasoning behind making the choice between a lump sum and 
annuity, the General Accounting Office stated the government’s preference for issuing 
lump sum payments in a 1985 report related to the Selected Reenlistment Bonus program. 
This report stated that “lump sum payments are: 1) More cost-efficient than installment 
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bonuses; 2) More readily visible to Congress and DoD decision-makers; and 3) Less 
limiting to decision- makers when fiscal reductions must be made (Ross, 2000).” Aside 
from eliminating any long term liability on the government’s behalf, lump sum payments 
ensure greater flexibility in dealing with future budgetary issues while bringing closure to 
the administrative burden of accounting for those who take the incentive after they 
separate. 
D. PROBLEM AREAS WITH PAST SEPARATION INCENTIVES 
Despite achieving the desired reductions in active duty end strength associated 
with the military’s downsizing attempts of the early nineties, many still debate the 
marginal success of the  program as well as whether or not these programs actually saved 
any money et al. According to the Congressional Budget Office’s 1999, The Drawdown 
of the Military Officer Corps (CBO, 1999), the VSI and SSB options for mid-career 
officers only increased voluntary separation rates for officers during this period by 1.6 
percentage points; further detailing that only 47 percent of mid-career officers who took 
advantage of these programs “would have stayed in the military if the services had 
continued their pre-drawdown retention policies.” This would indicate that 53% of the 
officers who separated during this timeframe would have left anyway, yet received the 
same compensation as a separating sailor who would have required a payment to forego 
any future military service. In other words, the separation payment these sailors received 
to leave was entirely surplus value, which is the difference between the sailor’s 
reservation wage, or the price he is willing to take to leave (in this case, nothing), and the 
price he would eventually take (the separation benefit).    
Even though some would argue that the true benefit of this program was the 
savings realized by avoiding the accrued values of future military pay and retirement 
benefits for separating individuals (Rogge, 1996), there is no indication of where this 
savings went following completion of the last drawdown or whether or not an actual 
“savings” took place. Most likely, this reduction in personnel costs simply served as an 
income transfer to fund another program, but there is no attainable data to show which 
program(s) benefited from these personnel cuts. As forecasted in Sea Power 21, it 
appears that the Navy was willing to sacrifice the future opportunity costs associated with 
labor to invest in capital (technology), but, to have a true “savings”, the marginal benefit 
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associated with the Navy’s investment in capital would have had to be equal to or greater 
than the marginal opportunity cost of what the Navy paid the departing sailor. Currently, 
there is no study available, which indicates if this took place. 
E. RESULTS OF PAST SEPARATION INCENTIVES 
As noted in a 2001 RAND study on the effects of voluntary separations incentives 
(Warner and Asch, 2001), all three options of the FY1992 and FY1993 National Defense 
Authorization Acts served as an effective measure to reduce active end strength. This 
study went on to note that, “generally, lower quality personnel did accept the offer,” 
quelling any worries about a mass exodus by those whom the services feared would leave 
due to the opportunity for greater potential earnings in the private sector. Because of 
DOPMA standards and reduced accessions, these voluntary separation incentives yielded 
a more senior force in the short run, dropping the percentage of officers in the Navy with 
less than eight years of service from 42 percent to 32 percent (CBO, 1999). However, 
time and increased accessions in the years following the drawdown have restored officer 
distribution by grade to pre-drawdown levels.   
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In the end, the Navy paid 848 officers $48.18 million during the early to mid-
nineties to leave the service through the Voluntary Separation Incentive and the Special 
Separation Benefit (Rogge, 1996). Although the true cost savings associated with these 
programs is debatable, there is no sound argument against its ability to achieve the 
desired effect – voluntary reductions in force levels. For this reason, when faced with the 
need to conduct additional cuts in active end strength as part of the modernization of the 
Fleet outlined in Sea Power 21 (Clarke, 2002), the United States Navy returned to the 
trusted process of offering lump sum payments to meet its reduction goals via the 
Targeted Separation Incentive program. 
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III. THE TARGETED SEPARATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
A. BACKGROUND 
With the publication of Sea Power 21 during October 2002, the Department of the 
Navy set out to undergo a major cultural transformation to “organize, integrate and 
transform” itself to meet the asymmetrical threats of the 21st Century. To accommodate 
the realignment of its organizational processes, while freeing up more funding to 
purchase the platforms and systems needed to bring about this transformation, DoN 
planned on separating more than 36,000 sailors from its active duty rolls. At the onset, 
from Fiscal Year 2003 through the end of FY2005, the Navy was able to reduce its end 
strength by 16,335 sailors without instituting additional reduction in force or voluntary 
separation incentive measures.  
When the FY2006/2007 DoN Budget Estimates for military personnel was 
released during February 2005, the Navy was looking to offer voluntary separation 
incentives in the form of Force Shaping Tools as its first attempt at compensating sailors 
to leave since the last drawdown. At this time, the Navy was looking at releasing 914 
officers and 781 enlisted sailors from active service through a program featuring a choice 
of an annuity or a lump sum buyout, plus six months of transition benefits and repeal of 
the expanded Selective Early Retirement authority.  This program was to be in effect for 
fiscal years 2006 and 2007 and was budgeted at the rate of $63,128.01 per officer and 
$59,573.62 per enlisted sailor. 
Soon thereafter, following the passage of the FY2006 National Defense 
Authorization Act, these numbers were further reduced to target only 502 officers at a rate 
of $56,773.00 per officer through the Targeted Separation Incentive program.  This 
voluntary separation option was crafted to “provide the Department of Defense (DoD) 
with a targetable, voluntary separation incentive to offer service members at various 
stages in their careers after they have served at least six years (Haynes, 2005).”  The 
underlying concept which drove the Targeted Separation Incentive program was that the 
services would start with the least expensive force-shaping measures to reduce end  
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strength (lump sum payments)  then progress to more expensive measures (annuities and 
early retirement) in order to achieve the proper mix of skills and experience to suit their 
needs.   
Beginning in FY2006, the Navy has authorized a single, lump sum payment as a 
separation incentive to officers with more than six, but less than 12 years of service, who 
have served at least five years of continuous active duty service immediately preceding 
the date of the officer’s separation from active duty. These payments are restricted to 
officers who have not already received a separation incentive nor are under review for an 
administrative discharge or a potential service-related disability separation. The officers 
separated under this program will be granted 6 months worth of in-kind benefits upon the 
date of separation and will be offered a lump sum, not to exceed 2 times involuntary 
separations pay (see Table 2 below).  The authority for this phase of the Targeted 
Separation Incentive program expires on December 31, 2008 (109th Congress, HR 1815).  
B. COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TSI PROGRAM 
Prior to the February 2006 update on the Department of the Navy’s budget 
estimates, the Navy had budgeted for $115.398 million to execute the targeted separation 
of 1,828 officers over a two year time span, FY2006 and FY2007. Following the most 
recent update, the Navy has reduced this sum to accommodate the departure of 520 
officers at a sum not to exceed $28.5 million. In a sense, the Department of the Navy 
realized an estimated $86.90 million in savings by simply waiting a year and allowing 
willing officers to depart via the natural means of voluntary separation. Meanwhile, the 
maximum cost associated with separating specific cohorts of officers under this program 
is exhibited in the table below.  
 
Maximum Cost to Separate Under FY2006 NDAA    
        
Paygrade 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
O-3 $64,843.20 $75,650.40 $90,794.88 $102,144.24 $117,007.20 $128,707.92 $147,337.92 
O-2 $55,468.80 $64,713.60 $73,958.40 $83,203.20 $92,448.00 $101,692.80 $110,937.60 
O-3E $64,843.20 $75,650.40 $90,794.88 $102,144.24 $117,007.20 $128,707.92 $147,337.92 
O-2E $55,468.80 $64,713.60 $76,314.24 $85,853.52 $100,353.60 $110,388.96 $125,038.08 
O-1E $46,746.72 $54,537.84 $64,627.20 $72,705.60 $83,728.80 $92,101.68 $103,947.84 




C. TARGETED SEPARATIONS AND REDUCED ACCESSIONS 
Following the guidance of Grissmer and company’s 1995 RAND study on the 
evaluation of alternative voluntary separation payments, the Targeted Separation 
Incentive program is buoyed in its attempt to reduce active end strength by a concurrent 
reduction in accessions (Grissmer, 1995). Although this is the most expedient means to 
reaching a reduction in end strength, the Navy must be cautious when dropping the entry 
of new officers below the steady state level of accessions necessary to fill future billets in 
more senior ranks. Since the Navy is required to compete with market forces in order to 
retain future cohorts of officers in necessary skill sets, any savings realized through the 
reduced accessions and separations could be quickly offset by increases in recruiting 
costs and the need for additional Special and Incentive (S&I) payments (Hansen, 2005).  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Seeing that the average TSI payment that the Navy has budgeted for, $56,773.00 
per officer, falls well below the advertised ceiling for most targeted cohorts (see Table 2) 
through the Targeted Separation Incentive, it will be very interesting to see how the 
Department of the Navy conducts this program prior to the end of Fiscal Year 2006 and 
what the price for voluntary separations will be. As Fiscal Year 2007 signals the end of 
the Navy’s measured drawdown of active forces, the future opportunities of officers 
within this target group must be considered as well as the prospect of extended 
deployments sailing off into harm’s way. Taking these factors into consideration, the 
remainder of this thesis will search for defining that price which would clear the market 
for future reductions as well as whether or not this program could be more efficiently 


































IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. BACKGROUND 
During December 2004, Joseph Reppert developed an Excel-based forecasting 
model, with the Crystal Ball add-in, to determine what the maximum cost to the Navy 
would be using voluntary separation incentives as well as what the minimum lump sum 
payment amount that the separating officer would be willing to take under similar 
circumstances (Reppert, 2004). In Reppert’s model, the intent was to observe “average” 
officers in the Navy “from all specialties.” With the help of the Crystal Ball add-in, this 
model was able to contain distribution functions for a number of the key variables within 
the model. These distributions “were used to create a range of values during Monte Carlo 
simulations” which allowed the model to take into account such factors as future 
promotion  possibilities, expected lifespan following retirement, and expected age at the 
time of retirement.  In all, Reppert conducted 12 model simulations to evaluate 3 different 
incentive options, using four different interest rates with each simulation containing 
5,000 trials. 
Once it became apparent that the Navy would resort to issuing lump sum 
payments, again, in order to solicit voluntary separations, the Reppert Model seemed like 
the most fitting tool to evaluate the costs associated with this program. Using the sum of 
the weighted averages of the present values associated with the probability of the officer 
reaching specific points in his or her career, this model provides a sound analysis of “the 
maximum incentives the Navy should offer” and offers a relatively accurate baseline for 
assessing the current Targeted Separation Incentive program.     
B. ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THE MODEL  
1. Basic Pay 
Found in Appendix A, this model uses the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service’s (DFAS) Fiscal Year 2006 Pay Charts to determine future payment streams in 
the form of military pay and retirement benefits. Although this model assumes away the 
effects of inflation over time, rationalizing that basic pay and retirement payment 
increases in the long run will be consistent with inflation, it is important to note that 
retirement pay and basic pay adjustments are based on two different principles. 
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Retirement pay is adjusted annually through Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) based 
on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Consumer Price Index (CPI: the base for 
inflation), while increases in basic pay are derived from another BLS index, the 
Employment Cost Index, which measures private sector wage growth (MMOA, 2006). In 
addition, these annual adjustments are a one-time increase administered on the 1st of 
January each fiscal year and are based on an authorization delivered in the month of 
October from the previous calendar year. This maneuver is designed to offset the prior 
year’s increase in its perspective index, but, generally, leaves the service member in a 
constant state of economic “catch up.”   
2. Rank 
Serving as the driving force in determining basic pay, rank is used in this model 
as a determinant for the present value retirement calculations of the separating officer as 
well as a reference for the officer being considered. Prior to running the model, the 
current rank is input into the model in order to determine the range of payments at 
different discount rates that the departing officer is willing to receive. For the purpose of 
the simulations used in this thesis, a Navy Lieutenant (O-3) at eight years of service and 
30 years of age serves as the reference for all analysis to be reviewed in the next chapter. 
In addition, rank serves as a measure of potential retirement payments in the present 
value calculations to determine the Navy’s maximum lump sum payment.  
3. Promotion and Retention Rates 
Taking into consideration the possibilities of future advancement coupled with the 
propensity for an officer to stay, this model incorporates a distribution of promotion and 
separation probabilities during the Monte Carlo simulations to determine the proper 
distribution of what the required lump sum payments to the departing officer should be 
(Appendix D). These probabilities are based on the decision trees in Appendix D and the 
Fiscal Year 2007 Board Precepts for Unrestricted Line Officers in the Navy at each 
designated rank. Using Reppert’s original model, a simulation was run with the rank of 
Captain (O-6) being the most senior rank achieved. Then, in order to adjust for the line of 




be more likely to retire at a rank no higher than Commander (O-5), another set of 
simulations was run to adjust for any career bias associated with the first model, yielding 
significantly different results. 
4. Years of Service at Retirement 
In order to ascertain what the maximum separation payment for the Navy should 
be under the Targeted Separation Incentive program, it was important to capture the 
actual range of years of service at retirement to determine their weighted present values 
for the Monte Carlo simulation. In the Reppert model, this range starts with a Lieutenant 
(O-3) at 20 years of service and reaches an upper limit of the rank of Captain (O-6) at 30 
years of service. Since the TSI program is focused on officers with more than 6, but less 
than 12 years of service, the simulation which corrected for career bias was run with the 
most senior rank at retirement being a Commander (O-5) at 23 years to account for 
possible retirement payment increases under the High-3 system which states that the final 
retirement pay for a military retiree shall be the average of his or her highest three years 
of basic pay prior to the date of retirement. In addition, the original model was altered to 
account for the most junior rank of separating officer being a Lieutenant Commander (O-
4) at 20 years of service because of the guidelines established by The Defense Officer 
Personnel Management Act of 1980.    
5. Age  
Using the current age of the officer at the time of separation, age factors heavily 
in determining the present value of retirement benefits since it, essentially, serves as the 
cornerstone for determining the age and life expectancy of the separating officer upon 
retirement. Using a non-prior service O-3 at eight years of service as the reference case in 
this model, the base age for the Monte Carlo simulations was 30 years of age with an age 
of retirement at 42 years.  
6.  Years of Service 
Unlike the original model which examined an “average” officer with the 
propensity to fall under all categories of service, enlisted years of service was not 
accounted for in this model. Since the Targeted Separation Incentive program required 
five years of continuous active service, and the average first term of enlistment is at least 
three years, it was assumed that the Navy would not entertain separating a prior service 
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officer until he had been passed over once for promotion to O-3, no earlier than the eight 
year mark. Since there would have been the requirement for these officers to attain a 
degree, this would add another four years to most scenarios, pushing these officers 
beyond the parameters of the program and making them ineligible for a separation 
incentive payment. Meanwhile, years of service was used to gauge the final age at 
retirement while running the simulations and determining the weighted present value of 
retirement. 
7.  Life Expectancy    
Outlined in Appendix C, life expectancy encompasses the number of years that 
the officer will remain alive following retirement. Based on the 2003 Department of 
Defense Actuary table used in Reppert’s model, life expectancy contributes significantly 
to the present value of retirement calculations used in this model. 
C.  DISCOUNT RATES USED  
Solely for the sake of comparison and further debate in Chapter VI, the discount 
rates used in this analysis mirror those used in the Reppert study (2004): a government 
discount rate of 7%, 10% and 13% (10% + 3%) and a personal discount rate of 16% with 
a standard deviation of + 2%. In addition, a 23% personal discount rate was included to 
evaluate the high end of officer acceptance rates noted in the last drawdown (Warner and 
Pleeter, 2001).  These discount rates were used to determine the present value 
calculations used in this model in order to establish a baseline for fixed price offers on 
behalf of the Navy.  
D.  COMPUTATIONS WITHIN THE MODEL  
Prior to running this model, all decision variables had to be adjusted to account 
for the “staying” behavior of the separating officer. In other words, the intent was to 
focus on what would be an adequate separation payment to induce an officer who had 
every intention to remain on active duty to leave. Since the original Reppert model 
included the 20% of officers at O-3 who would have left without a separation incentive, 
anyway, the model was tailored to focus on the cost associated with separating that 




corrected for career bias. In addition, solely for the sake of comparison, the original 
Reppert model was run using FY2006 pay tables. This data yielded the following 
computations: 
1.  The Maximum Lump Sum Offer by the Navy 
Looking at this as an unconstrained optimization problem, the maximum lump 
sum payment by the Navy should not exceed the Net Benefit of this program where: 
Net Benefit (TSI) = Total Benefit (TSI) – Total Cost (TSI) 
Since the total benefit of this program could be viewed as the sum of the present 
value (PV) of the forecasted retirement payments plus the present value of future active 
duty payments in the form of regular military compensation (RMC), this equation can be 
translated to look like this: 
Net Benefit (TSI) = (PVretirement + PVactive duty) – Opportunity Cost to Navy 
Seeing that the opportunity cost to the Navy of losing one officer is roughly 
equivalent to the streams of RMC payments the Navy would have foregone to reap the 
work associated with this officer’s service, the net benefit of this program is, in fact, the 
savings realized in the form of foregone retirement payments to the separating officer. 
For this reason, the Department of the Navy’s maximum lump sum payment should not 
exceed the present value of the forecasted retirement for the separating officer. In this 
model, the base case will be a 30-year old O-3 at eight years of service. 
Although this oversimplifies the equation, we can not forget that with each 
departing sailor, the Navy loses the capabilities associated with the reason that person 
was part of the Navy’s active end strength to begin with, i.e. the skills and abilities he 
contributed to the national defense. While there is a dollar value associated with the 
opportunity cost of retaining a sailor which is reflected in the future streams of payments 
that sailor would receive, the Navy also loses additional capabilities associated with each 
sailors’ departure whether it is in the form of a watch officer, supply officer or command 
billet somewhere in the Fleet. For this reason, the idea that the Navy is actually saving 
anything during a drawdown is only relative to what our nation’s security requirements 
need. Only if the marginal benefit of future capabilities realized through the procurement  
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of capital exceeds the marginal cost of separating these officers under the Targeted 
Separation Incentive program, will there be a savings realized through the voluntary 
separations of mid-career officers from the Fleet.  
2.  The Minimum Incentive Offer for the Individual to Leave 
Considering the constraints mentioned at the beginning of this section to account 
for separating officers who wish to stay, the minimum lump sum that an individual is 
willing to take is derived from discounting the present value of retirement payments and 
conducting sensitivity analysis to see how these payments would effect a general 
population under a normal distribution. This separation behavior will be analyzed using 
the personal discount rate as well as the 23% discount rate discussed in the study 
conducted by Warner and Pleeter (2001) which more accurately reflects the separation 
behavior of junior officers during the last drawdown. Next, this data will be assessed to 
determine the minimum requirement to separate roughly three percent (502) of the 
targeted Lieutenants (O-3’s) from the general population of the officers in this cohort and 
used as the basis for our assessment of the Targeted Separation Incentive program.  
E.  SIMULATION PROCEDURES 
Using an Excel model with the Crystal Ball add-in, 10 Monte Carlo simulations 
were run considering the assumptions listed in the preceding paragraphs. Five simulations 
were run in order to duplicate the results offered in the Reppert study, and, an additional 
five simulations were run to account for the perceived career bias of the first model. Each 
simulation contained 5,000 trials and conducted sensitivity analysis on the outcomes of 
the distributions from the trials.  
F.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Upon completion of these simulations, enough data had been retrieved to offer a 
sound analysis of the Targeted Separation Incentive program. The remainder of this 
thesis will focus on the outcomes of this analysis as well as a look at alternative means to 
deliver voluntary separation incentive payments.   
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V.  DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
Throughout the course of this chapter, the data presented for analysis centers on 
the cost to the Navy to separate Lieutenants (O-3’s) at six, eight and 10 years of service 
under the Targeted Separation Incentive program. The first part of this chapter takes a 
look at the maximum lump sum offer the Navy should make to the departing officer 
based on different discount rates of the present value of the foregone retirement. The 
discount rates used in this analysis are based on a government discount rate of 10% with 
a standard deviation of + 3%. The personal discount rate (PDR) used is 16% with a 
standard deviation of + 2%. In addition, this analysis takes into consideration the 23% 
discount rate which Warner and Pleeter identified as the high end discount rate for takers 
during the last military drawdown (Warner and Pleeter, 2001). 
After reviewing the maximum cost the Navy should offer, followed by the 
minimum amount the separating officer would be willing to take, the costs associated 
with the Targeted Separation Incentive program are considered later in this chapter as 
they relate to the ceilings established in the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense 
Authorization Act and the Department of the Navy Budget Estimates for FY2006. 
A.  NAVY’S MAXIMUM RECOMMENDED OFFER 
1.  Based on an Average 0-3 
In the original Reppert model, all computations were based on the probability of 
an average officer retiring at 26 years of service as a Captain (O-6), indexed to consider 
the normal distributions of promotion opportunities, life expectancy following retirement 
and the stay or leave behavior of the officer at a certain point in his career. As seen in 
Appendices C and D, these probabilities are based on the information provided in the 
decision trees which reflects promotion and retention probabilities, stating the probability 
that 52.7 percent of all Lieutenants who decide to make the Navy a career will be 
afforded the opportunity to retire as a Captain (O-6) while only 80 percent of that cohort 
will stay until reaching the rank of Lieutenant Commander (O-4). This decision tree does 
not account for retirement trends or factors involving other forms of involuntary 
separation. Using weighted averages, a present value of future payments was determined 
to serve as the maximum payment the Navy should offer the departing individual. The 
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payments listed in this section reflect what it would take to induce the 25 percentile of 
officers currently serving on active duty to depart through a voluntary separation 
incentive program. Any price below this can be viewed as surpluses realized by the 
government. For the sake of this thesis, this model (Table 3) will serve as the reference 
for further analysis. 
 
Active Duty Retirement Cost Calculations (Present Value) RM-WA 
Retirement 7% 10% 13% PDR 23% 
O-3 @ 6 $160,889 $70,216 $33,003 $16,449 $3,836 
O-3 @ 8 $184,201 $84,961 $42,142 $22,134 $5,803 
O-3 @ 10 $210,892 $102,803 $53,811 $29,784 $8,780 
Table 3. Calculations Based on Average Officer 
 
2.  Based on an Average O-3 Determined to Stay 
In the original model, the probability for future advancement of these officers was 
dependent upon the probability of these officers advancing or remaining on active duty to 
reach the next rank. Because of this, 20% of the O-3 population which would have left, 
anyway, without the incentive, was factored into this equation. By manipulating the 
model, we were able to omit this population to indicate that all O-3’s would remain on 
active duty, providing a clearer picture of how much it would cost to separate an officer 
who had no intentions of leaving. The table below (Table 4), accounts for those that do 
not plan on leaving and offers the maximum lump sum payment the Navy should offer to 
those who would not leave without a separation payment. Understandably, the totals for 
each category are much higher than those displayed in the first model.  
 
Active Duty Retirement Cost Calculations (Present Value) RM-Stay 
Retirement 7% 10% 13% PDR 23% 
O-3 @ 6 $201,802 $88,072 $41,396 $20,632 $4,811 
O-3 @ 8 $231,043 $106,567 $52,858 $27,763 $7,279 
O-3 @ 10 $264,522 $128,946 $67,495 $37,358 $11,012 
Table 4. Calculations Based on Average Officer Determined to Stay 




3.  Average 0-3 Model Corrected for Career Bias 
After realizing that there was a significant difference in the maximum lump sum 
offer for the Navy based on the intentions to leave or stay, I wanted to examine the 
effects on one’s intentions to stay beyond the 20-year mark for retirement. Using 20 years 
for O-4’s and 23 years at O-5 as the high year tenure limits for officers, the model was 
altered to account for a career bias that was evident in the baseline model. For this reason, 
the model was manipulated, once again, to ensure that the probability of reaching O-6 
was equal to zero, as was the probability of staying beyond 23 years at O-5. Comparing 
these figures to the “average” O-3” (Table 5), it was clear that these officers placed a 
higher value on their retirement at the higher discount rates while de-valuing it as the 
discount rate dropped. This would account for the timing and magnitude of savings these 
officers would place on their future retirement associated with the opportunity costs 
related to staying beyond the 20-year mark. 
 
Active Duty Retirement Cost Calculations (Present Value) CP-WA 
Retirement 7% 10% 13% PDR 23% 
O-3 @ 6 $150,887 $69,820 $34,789 $18,343 $4,817 
O-3 @ 8 $172,750 $84,482 $44,423 $24,683 $7,287 
O-3 @ 10 $197,782 $102,224 $56,723 $33,213 $11,025 
Table 5. Calculations Based on Average Officer: No Career Bias 
 
4.  Corrected for Career Bias; Determined to Stay 
Upon reviewing the first three models, it was determined that the most accurate 
method for assessing the true cost of separating those who would not, otherwise, leave 
under normal circumstances, was to evaluate the cost associated with separating a 
member determined to stay until 20 years of service; then abruptly leave. Using the same 
rationale stated in the paragraph above, this model was altered to only account for those 
who would have preferred to remain on active duty.  As expected, this model indicated a 
lower present value for retirement at the 7-10 percent discount rate range than the 
“average” O-3, while showing a higher value for the larger discount rates (Table 6). 
Again, this would reflect this individual’s lower value placed on serving beyond twenty 
years while placing a higher value on the time-value of money marked by this 
individual’s immediate intentions to stay.  
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Active Duty Cost Retirement Calculations (Present Value) CP-Stay 
Retirement 7% 10% 13% PDR 23% 
O-3 @ 6 $188,608 $87,275 $43,487 $22,929 $6,021 
O-3 @ 8 $215,938 $105,603 $55,528 $30,853 $9,109 
O-3 @ 10 $247,227 $127,780 $70,904 $41,516 $13,781 
Table 6.  Calculations Based on Staying Officer: No Career Bias 
 
B.  INDIVIDUAL’S MINIMUM REQUIREMENT 
Using the personal discount rate of 16 percent described in Chapter IV, a mean 
value was determined to separate the target population of Lieutenants with eight years of 
service. As shown in Table 7 below, there was a marked increase in the lowest price that 
the “stayer” was willing to take versus the minimum requirement for the “average” 
officer. This margin was, again, increased when the model was corrected for career bias. 
For the remainder of this thesis, the CP-Stay category (“stayers”; corrected for career 
bias) will serve as the benchmark for further analysis. 
 
Minimum Individual Requirement – PDR  
  RM-WA RM-Stay CP-WA CP-Stay 
O-3 @ 6 $16,449 $20,632  $18,343  $22,929 
O-3 @ 8 $22,134 $27,763  $24,683  $30,853 
O-3 @ 10 $29,784 $37,358  $33,213  $41,516 
Table 7. Minimum Individual Payment Based on PDR 
 
Meanwhile, even though the personal discount rate was used in this analysis to 
account for the rationale decision-making abilities of our junior officers, the Warner and 
Pleeter study did show a tendency for junior officers to accept separation payments at 
much higher discount rates than previously thought. Using a log linear model, Warner 
and Pleeter determined that the “average” officer at nine years of service would have 
accepted the Special Separation Benefit at a 23.2 percent discount rate. For the sake of 
argument, this discount rate was observed for the O-3 at eight years of service used as the 






Minimum Individual Requirement - 23% Discount Rate 
  RM-WA RM-Stay CP-WA CP-Stay 
O-3 @ 6 $3,836 $4,811 $4,817 $6,021
O-3 @ 8 $5,803 $7,279 $7,287 $9,109
O-3 @ 10 $8,780 $11,012 $11,025 $13,781
Table 8. Minimum Individual Payment Based on 23% Discount Rate 
 
As expected, these figures were substantially lower than the expected values using 
the personal discount rate even though they probably offer a more accurate portrayal of 
the minimum offer these officers would have been willing to receive. This raises an 
excellent prospect for future research where an experiment could be run to determine if 
the Navy could attain the required number of separations if they were to advertise the 
lump sum targeted separation payments at this rate. This would serve as an excellent 
model for a discussion on rationale human behavior.  
C.  COST TO SEPARATE UNDER FY2006 NDAA AUTHORITY 
Annex E displays the costs associated with separating officers under the 
maximum authority outlined in the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act. Under 
the provisions of the FY2006 NDAA, the Department of the Navy may use a targeted 
separation incentive, payable in a single, lump sum payment, not to exceed twice 
involuntary separations pay. With this as our measure for determining the surplus values 
paid to departing sailors, the minimum lump sum payment using the personal discount 
rate was subtracted from the figures found in Annex E. The surplus payments made to 
departing sailors are shown in the table below:  
 
Surplus Cost to Separate Under FY2006 NDAA  
  RM-WA RM-Stay CP-WA CP-Stay 
O-3 @ 6 $48,394 $44,211  $46,500  $41,914 
O-3 @ 8 $68,661 $63,032  $66,112  $59,942 
O-3 @ 10 $87,223 $79,649  $83,794  $75,491 
Table 9. Surplus Payments to Departing Officers Due to Separations Under FY2006 
NDAA 
 
As disturbing as these numbers may seem to the average taxpayer during times of 
war, the original recommendation from the Department of Defense that was approved by 
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the Vice President (Haynes, 2005) in the original Voluntary Separation Incentive 
program considered authorizing four times involuntary separations pay as the standard 
for distributing targeted separations. The surplus values associated with voluntary 
separation incentive payments under this program are reflected in Table 10 below. 
 
Surplus Cost to Separate Under Original House Plan  
  RM-WA RM-Stay CP-WA CP-Stay 
O-3 @ 6 $113,237 $109,054  $111,343  $106,757  
O-3 @ 8 $159,456 $153,827  $156,907  $150,737  
O-3 @ 10 $204,230 $196,656  $200,801  $192,498  
Table 10. Surplus Payments to Departing Officers Separating Under Original VSI Plan 
 
In order to fully appreciate these numbers, one only has to consider the surplus 
payments associated with separating a specific cohort of officers under the Targeted 
Separation Incentive program. For instance, if the Navy planned to separate 502 
“average” (RM-WA) Lieutenants at 10 years of service, the Department of the Navy 
would have paid roughly $102.5 million beyond what that same cohort would have taken 
to separate under similar conditions – roughly $14.95 million. Had this measure gone 
through, officers would literally be jumping overboard to contact the separations officer 
en route to joining the Republican Party.  
Fortunately for the Navy, this measure did not go though. But, this serves as a 
perfect example of how broad interpretations of the costs associated with separating an 
officer can have a tremendous effect on the cost of a program and end up defeating its 
original intent. While examining a number of other studies that have been conducted on 
the costs associated with the last drawdown (Reppert, Rogge, Warner and Pleeter, et al), 
most viewed the present value of future active duty compensation as an additional factor 
to consider when determining the service’s net savings. The error in this rationale is that 
while the service does recoup the money from paying the separating officer, they also 
lose the capability they were paying for in terms of that individual’s net contribution to 
the organization. This contribution, which is the opportunity cost associated with 
employing the separated officer in the first place, will then need to be either outsourced 
through government contracts or eliminated altogether. Since the intent of the Navy’s 
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reduction in force from Sea Power 21 is to reinvest in capital, the saving realized from 
the future pay streams of the separating member amount to nothing more than an income 
transfer, thus making the present value of the foregone retirement as the only potential 
cost savings to the government. 
D.  COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH TSI PROGRAM 
Under the Targeted Separation Incentive program, a different approach was taken 
to craft a strategy to induce officers to leave. Basically, the Navy budgeted for the 
separation of 502 officers at a rate equivalent to the average officer lump sum payment 
during the last drawdown ($56,773.00). Since the Navy will reach its steady state end 
strength at the end of Fiscal Year 2007 under the current plan, this will be a one-time 
adjustment for the current officer population which will most likely be executed prior to 
the start of the final quarter of this fiscal year (no guidance has been submitted as of 12 
March 2006). Although it may seem a bit sophomoric to plan based on the last 
drawdown’s average take rate, this method comes much closer to the actual value of what 
the separating officer would take under the FY2006 NDAA and the original House of 
Representatives’ plan.   
Using the budgeted amount for separations as the baseline for the evaluation of 
this program ($56,773.00), another table was created to show the added payments that 
would be issued to separating officers in the form of surplus payments under the TSI 
program. This table was derived from taking the four categories for analysis outlined in 
Section A of this Chapter at the personal discount rate of 16 percent (taking into account 
leave/stay behavior and correcting for career bias) and subtracting each number from the 
budgeted amount for the Targeted Separation Incentive program.  The results are shown 
in the Table 11 below. 
 
Surplus Cost to Separate Under FY2006 TSI  
  RM-WA RM-Stay CP-WA CP-Stay 
O-3 @ 6 $40,324 $36,141  $38,430  $33,844  
O-3 @ 8 $34,639 $29,010  $32,090  $25,920  
O-3 @ 10 $26,989 $19,415  $23,560  $15,257  
Table 11. Surplus Payments to Departing Officers Associated with Separations Under TSI 
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Even under a significantly tighter budget there is still a substantial surplus paid to 
the separating officers. Using the same 502 “average” (RM-WA) Lieutenants at 10 years 
of service, the Department of the Navy would still forego an additional $13.55 million in 
costs associated with paying the departing service member more than he would “take” 
under a more efficient system. For this reason, another Monte Carlo simulation was run 
to determine the cost to separate only the targeted group which accounted for roughly 3 
percent of the population of active duty Lieutenants. This was done by, once again, 
eliminating the 20 percent of Lieutenants who would otherwise leave the Navy under 
normal circumstances and focusing on the additional 3 percent the Navy is targeting for 
separations. 
The results, shown in the frequency chart below, shows that a lump sum payment 
of $8,895.00 is all that it would take to induce an additional 3.18 percent of the O-3 
population at eight years of service, beyond the 20% that would leave without an 
incentive payment, to leave at the personal discount rate. This encompasses a range of 
payments that starts with the minimum value of $3,958.00 for the first officer to separate 
and an upper limit for a lump sum payment of $8,895.00 to separate the last. By using a 
baseline, lump sum payment of $8,895.00, the Navy should be able to achieve its desired 
end state in force reductions at the lowest fixed price. Even under this scenario, there is 
still government loss in the form of surplus payments issued to all departing sailors 
except for the last one who is just willing to separate for $8,895 as is reflected in the 
shaded area in the chart below.   
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$5,399 $19,198 $32,997 $46,796 $60,595
5,000 Trials    130 Outliers 
Forecast: Minimum Lump Sum Personal DR O-3 
 
Figure 1.   Frequency Chart: O-3 at 8 YOS PDR 
 
E.  CHAPTER SUMMARY  
It is impossible for the Navy to effectively separate the 20 percent willing to leave 
without a separation incentive at no cost, then effectively separate the remaining 3.18 
percent targeted for separation at a fixed price of $8,895; the Navy must determine if it is 
worth paying the total 23.18 percent of the officer population targeted for separations 
$8,895 to leave when, in reality, the only portion they would be required to pay to 
separate is just 3.18 percent. Using this example for the Targeted Separation Incentive 
program, the Navy would have to pay a lower limit value of $4.47 million to separate 502 
officers when the actual total cost needed to separate those not willing to leave without 
compensation would only be $612,580.77.  
Meanwhile, the Department of the Navy has budgeted $28.5 million for this 
program. This shows that roughly $27.9 million of the $28.5 million allocated for the 
Targeted Separation Incentive program will be paid to junior officers who would 
normally leave without the lump sum payment based on the assumptions mentioned 
above. This begs an even larger question of whether or not this program is actually worth 
its actual cost. Although a reduction in force has the potential to have a negative effect on 
morale (Grissmer et al., 1995), the $28.5 million price tag needed to separate an 
additional 3.18 percent of the Navy officer corps may be worth the risk of not executing 
this program at all.  
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Based on these findings, it is apparent that there will always be loss in the form of 
surplus costs paid to separating officers while using a fixed price to determine the 
minimum value to separate a targeted percentile of junior officers. This minimum price is 
further complicated by the individual’s own perceived value of future cash flows in terms 
of benefits and regular military compensation. For this reason, the following chapter will 
focus on alternative means to reaching targeted separations, which will be followed by 





VI.   POSSIBLE USE OF AUCTIONS AS FORCE SHAPING TOOL 
Having examined the effects of various discount rates and assumptions as they 
relate to the Department of the Navy’s Targeted Separation Incentive program, the next 
step in this process is to determine the most efficient mechanism for realizing the desired 
number of officer separations. As palatable as the original House of Representatives plan 
may have seemed (see Appendix E), there is obviously a clear divide between the lump 
sum separation benefit that the government deems affordable and what the departing 
officer needs. In addition, one must consider the fact that all regression results linked to 
the last military drawdown would be clearly biased by a booming economy during the 
nineties complemented by a nation at peace.    
To define that balance between an efficient way to clear the market for force 
reductions while exhibiting some form of fiscal constraint, the government has sponsored 
volumes of studies on the factors affecting one’s desires to leave or stay in the military in 
an attempt to reach a fixed price solution for their force shaping needs. The end result has 
always led to follow-on discussions of the surplus values associated with such programs 
since there is always a surplus paid to all departing sailors except one, assuming the 
government is able to accurately reach that precise, fixed price solution targeted at 
achieving the desired number of separations. As illustrated by Figure 1 in Chapter V, and 
shown once again below, a fixed price solution only matches the reservation price of the 
last person separated, creating a varying surplus paid the other separating sailors. As a 
result, most departing sailors will leave with a separation payment, which is greater than 
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Figure 2.   Frequency Chart: O-3 at 8 YOS PDR 
 
For this reason, some have viewed auction theory as a viable alternative for 
eliminating the surplus payments doled out by the government under a fixed price 
system. Citing problems associated with trying to avoid an offer that is “too good to be 
true” that would encourage an excessive amount of talented individuals to leave or 
offering a fixed price that is not high enough to achieve the desired effect, many see an 
auction mechanism as the most efficient means to cull targeted groups for separation at 
the lowest government rate. However, before we start discussing auction theory, we must 
first understand auctions as they pertain to the individual’s reservation price, which is the 
lowest value that sailor is willing to take to separate from the Navy.   
A.  DETERMINING THE INDIVIDUAL’S RESERVATION PRICE 
In the book, Quasi-Rational Economic Behavior, author Richard Thaler examines 
reasons why two individuals faced with the same budget constraints generally would 
apply their resources to attaining two different baskets of goods, or “consumption 
bundles.” Thaler outlines three distinct reasons for this: “1) the individuals have different 
tastes (utility functions); (2) the individuals have different information; [and/or] (3) one 
of the individuals has made a mistake.” Regardless of the reasoning behind the madness, 
all three factors, either independently or combined, yield what is most commonly referred 
to as the reservation price that the individual is willing to forego in order to gain that 
basket of goods (Thaler, 2001).  
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In microeconomics, the reservation price is the maximum price (opportunity cost) 
a buyer is willing to pay, or the opportunity cost he is willing to forego, in order to buy a 
good or service.  As it pertains to the seller, the reservation price is the minimum price 
for which a seller is willing to sell a good or service or the least opportunity cost the 
seller is willing to forego. The reservation price will vary for buyers and sellers according 
to their disposable income and their desire for the good or service, as well as the prices of 
and information relating to substitute goods (like items which will be consumed in 
different proportions based on the relative price of one of the goods, i.e. margarine and 
butter or Pepsi and Coke). This is important to research on the separation behavior of all 
service members because the reservation price is, ultimately, what drives the decision of 
the individual whether to stay or go. Any price above the reservation price for a targeted 
cohort of individuals would provide the incentive for a larger number of quality 
individuals to depart, while any amount lower would cause such a program not to achieve 
the desired number of separations.   
B.  REDUCING ECONOMIC RENT ASSOCIATED WITH PAST 
PROGRAMS 
Because of the huge variance associated with separating large populations of 
sailors at their reservation price, past attempts have focused on offering an equitable price 
targeted at clearing a defined percentile of individuals at a fixed price. This reliance on a 
fixed price system left the perception that the Department of the Navy realized substantial 
losses in the form of surplus payments paid to departing officers (more than $33.24 
million)1  above their reservation price during the last drawdown (Rogge, 1996). To 
recapture these lost costs during the life of the Targeted Separation Incentive program 
and avoid the forecasted losses described in Chapter V, the distribution of lump sum 
payments determined by auctions could help the government avoid loss associated with 




1 In Frank Roffe’s 1996 study, An Analysis of the Separation Bonus (VSI/SSB) Program Using the 
Annualized Cost of Leaving Model, the author determined that, with an average SSB payment of $56,813 
paid to the 848 Navy officers who left under the previous program, that $48.18 million was distributed to 
these officers in paid separation incentives. Rogge’s research concluded through a probit regression model 
that 68.99 percent of those officers would have left without the incentive, yielding $33.24 million “accrued 
to separatees as economic rent.” 
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C.  A BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF AUCTIONS 
In layman’s terms, an auction is simply “a market institution with an explicit set 
of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market 
participants (McAfee and McMillan, 1987).” There are basically two methods for 
conducting auctions: 1) the open or sequential bid auction and 2) the sealed or 
simultaneous bid auction. Like its namesake, the open bid auction is one where all the 
participants have equal knowledge of the current bid and have an equal opportunity to 
either raise or lower the price dependent on the intent of the auction. In a sealed, 
simultaneous bid auction, the participants are afforded a single, concurrent opportunity to 
present their offer to the bid-taker. When referring to auctions, most people think of the 
ascending order, open bid auction, called the English auction, where the first thing that 
comes to mind is a fast-talking gentleman “opening the floor” by announcing to “let the 
bidding start” at what is referred to as the reserve price of the seller in the auction. The 
reserve price is basically the lowest amount the seller is willing to take for a good or 
service in the forward auction or the highest price the buyer is willing to forego in a 
reverse auction.  
Much like the format favored by the auctioneer, the forward auction is one which 
generally consists of one seller and multiple buyers. The bid-taker is the one selling the 
good or service and the person who walks away with the prize is the high bidder. On the 
other hand, a reverse auction is marked by one buyer and multiple sellers. The buyer in 
this case is the bid-taker and the winner in this format is the participant who offers the 
lowest bid. Regardless of the modus operandi, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem tells us 
that when bidders are risk neutral and some other basic assumptions are satisfied, then 
each auction “yields on average the same price” (McAfee and McMillan, 1987).  
However, as McAfee points out, “when assumptions that underlie the benchmark 
model are relaxed, particular auction forms emerge as being superior” (McAfee and 
McMillan, 1987). Since the Department of the Navy lacks the resources to pull its sailors 
from all corners of the globe to sit down and realistically conduct a sequential, open bid 
auction, regardless of the individual’s access to the Internet, the most likely mechanism 
to conduct any form of targeted separation program would be through the use of a  
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simultaneous, sealed bid auction.  The two types of sealed bid auctions we will examine 
for the sake of this analysis will be the first price sealed bid auction (FPSB) and second 
price sealed bid auction (SPSB).     
D.  FIRST PRICE VERSUS SECOND PRICE AUCTION 
Given the nature of what the Navy is attempting to achieve through the Targeted 
Separation Incentive program, the separation of a specific number of officers at the 
lowest cost to the government, the most appropriate medium for conducting the sealed 
bid auction would be using a reverse auction format. In this case, the Department of the 
Navy would serve as the sole buyer with the departing officers serving as multiple sellers 
of their foregone retirement benefits plus the opportunity costs associated with the 
present value of their work as a Navy officer. Before this auction would be conducted, it 
would fall on the Navy to ensure that all participants were granted access to all figures 
associated with their service in regard to the present value of compensation and 
retirement benefits. 
1.  First Price Sealed Bid Auction (FPSB) 
Most commonly used for soliciting government procurement contracts, first price 
sealed bid auctions are a mechanism where potential buyers submit a one-time, sealed bid 
to the seller for the good or service he desires. In a forward FPSB auction, the 
equilibrium strategy for the person willing to pay at a given value, v, with n number of 
bidders and m computers for sale, where v is a value with a range from 0 to V, the 
maximum limit of v, such that , v ~U [0, V], the strategic bid, B = [(n-m)/n ] * v. So, if 
there are 502 computers being sold out of a total population of 15,000 bidders with a 
hypothetical reservation price, or maximum value, of $56,773.00, then the strategic bid 
for these computers would be $54,804.87 {B = [(15,000-520)/15,000] * 56,773}. As the 
number of bidders increases, with a fixed number of computers, the expected value of B 
will approach the true value of v. However, as the number of computers sold increases 
with a fixed number of bidders, then there will be a tendency for the value of B to 
approach zero. 
Using the same values for the reverse auction, which is the proper format for the 
TSI program, given a reservation wage (price) w, where w ~ U [0,V], the strategic bid in 
this case, Br = V - [(n-m)/n ] * (V – w). Now, if the maximum reservation wage, V, is 
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equivalent to $56,773 and there are 502 officers being separated out of a population of 
15,000, then Br = $56,773 - [.96533] * ($56,773 – w). In this scenario, the bid is truly 
driven by the reservation wage of the departing individual when the total population and 
number of bidders are set. When looking at providing a separation incentive payment 
designed to separate a targeted percentile, p, the strategic bid, Br, therefore, would beBr 
= V – (1 – p)*(V-w). Any surpluses gained or lost in this environment would be 
strategically determined by the number of bidders and individual’s reservation wage. 
As Gates, et al, determined, this is the most efficient manner to conduct 
separations auctions because of its “efficiency, cost effectiveness, equitability and 
practicality, based on recent market design and auction theory” (Gates, 2005). As shown 
in the graph below, the equilibrium bid for any reservation wage, w, would be above the 
true value of w, with the difference being greater for lower values of w. Using the 
formula mentioned above, Br = V – (1–p) * (V-w), would produce the equilibrium bid 
line which shows that as the targeted percentile for separations decreases, that the bid line 
and cumulative distribution function (CDF) will converge. This shows, once again, that 
as the number of winning bidders decreases, the optimal bidding strategy for the 
departing sailor would be to bid his true reservation price, w. Payments to the departing 
sailors by the Navy under a FPSB auction (shown by the dashed line area) would be 
roughly equivalent to the total payment to departing sailors under the optimal (i.e. 
minimal market clearing) fixed price solution (shown by the dotted line area). This would 
eliminate the need for establishing a baseline discount rate and would provide valuable 
information in determining the separations behavior of officers needed for additional 
research despite the fact that the sailor’s true valuation would be biased by his 




Figure 3.   Surpluses Associated with FPSB Auction 
 
2.  Second Price Sealed Bid Auction (SPSB) 
Unlike the first price sealed bid auction, the dominant strategy in the second price 
sealed bid auction is to simply bid one’s true private valuation. In a reverse auction 
setting, the winner would be the departing officer who offers the lowest bid for 
separations; however, that officer would be paid the next higher bid. When there are 
multiple winning bidders, this format is called an “nth” price sealed bid auction. Using 
this method, where there would be a number of winners equal to n-1, the entire group 
would be paid the final bid from the nth lowest bidder. As shown in the graph below, this 
would yield similar surplus values to the original fixed price system, assuming that the 
fixed price is set correctly, even though it would provide a much better perspective on the 














Figure 4.   Surpluses Associated with “nth” bid SPSB Auction 
 
E.  RELATIVE VALUE OF FUTURE STUDIES TO DETERMINE THE 
DISCOUNT RATES OF SAILORS 
As mentioned in the earlier paragraphs of this chapter, the use of auctions 
provides an even greater benefit to the Department of the Navy than just realizing a more 
cost-effective means for reducing end strength, this mechanism offers first hand data on 
the behavior of our sailors with a more easily definable discount rate based on the price 
each sailor associates with his prospective departure. Since past analyses on separation 
incentive programs were based on estimates of take rates for these separation programs as 
they related to previous data derived from Department of Defense surveys, the use of 
auctions would help the researcher gain a greater understanding of the decision-making 
process of the sailor’s intentions to leave or stay as it relates to a snapshot of the current 
military socio-economic environment. With this data, our leaders and policymakers can 
better tailor future decisions affecting the shape of the force in order to address the 
challenges to come.   
F.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
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While some may point to an auction mechanism as the Navy’s “silver bullet” 
when it comes to delivering separation incentive payments, one can not forget that these 
tools can only facilitate setting a more accurate fixed price for inducing those to separate. 
In an auction environment, those with a low reservation price will be encouraged to bid 
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closer to their maximum value than their lowest bid, eliminating any hope of attaining 
these individuals’ true reservation price. In addition, there will still be a requirement to 
finance the departure of those who would have been willing to leave without the 
incentive payment, resulting in nothing more than a total cost of the program that is 
equivalent to what the cost of the program would have been if the established fixed price 
was accurately set. 
Basically, this means that the Navy is still paying 23 percent of the junior officer 
corps to separate when the actual target is only 3 percent. Because of this, the net benefit 
of separating the 3 percent of officers who would require that a separation payment must 
exceed the present value of separating the entire 23 percent. Using the Targeted 
Separation Incentive Program as a reference, this can be explained in the equation below: 
Net Benefit of Separations * 3% = Cost of TSI * 23% 
Therefore, the Net Benefit of Separations must be greater than or equal to the cost 
of this program multiplied by 23 percent and divided by 3 percent. In net terms, this 
would mean that the present value of separating this 3 percent of officers would have to 
be greater than [(23/3) * $56,773.00] which is equal to $435,259.67 per officer separated 
further begging the question if the Targeted Separation Incentive program is really worth 
the investment.    
Nevertheless, auctions ensure that the separation payment is accurately set, so 
they are a cost-effective means to ensuring officer separations that reduce the substantial 
surpluses associated with a fixed price plan. Additionally, this mechanism would offer 
greater insight into the separations behavior of our service members than the standard 
survey because of the heightened stakes associated with the opportunity costs of the 
bidder in relation to one participating in a survey: the opportunity cost of the bidder is 
equivalent to a life-changing decision while the opportunity cost of the individual 





For this reason, the Department of the Navy should seriously consider using an 
auction format in order effect separating junior officers through the Targeted Separation 













VII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  SUMMARY 
Having tracked this program for the last six months when it was known only as 
the Force Shaping Tools that were designed to induce voluntary separations, the Targeted 
Separation Incentive program has hardly grown despite the original optimism reflected in 
Chapter V with the publishing of the original House plan (Haynes, 2005). Since then, the 
maximum price the government was willing to forego has sequentially dropped from four 
times involuntary separations pay, to three times, to twice as much as we sit here, now, 
with a budget that has been allocated to fund this program at a rate that, realistically, does 
not cover the involuntary separation of a Lieutenant at 10 years of service for failure to 
select for promotion to O-4 ($56,773 for the TSI program versus $58,503 for the O-3 
failing to promote, Appendix E). Meanwhile, the Department of the Navy has 
systematically met its force reduction goals despite the requirement to cull 36,955 sailors 
from Fiscal Year 2003 through FY2007.  
So, what has been happening over the last couple of years and how has the 
Department of the Navy met such unparalleled success? Well, the answer may lie in the 
fact that there appears to be a significant retention crisis for the Navy looming on the 
horizon which may gradually offset any savings realized during the most recent measured 
drawdown. Instead of creating a strategically sound program to offset reduction goals 
with future Fleet requirements, the Navy sought a strategy marked by reduced accessions 
and the failure to select officers for promotion to meet their force shaping needs. In Fiscal 
Year 2005 alone, the Navy paid involuntary separation payments to 11,780 officers for 
non-promotion which is more than double the numbers for each of the prior two years 
(FY2003-2004) as well as the forecasted numbers for the following two Fiscal Years, 
2006 and 2007 (DoN, 2005 and 2006). In addition, during Fiscal Year 2005, the Navy 
was the only service which failed to meet a specific cohort retention goal (mid-career 
officers and sailors) despite the fact that the average Navy officer makes roughly 
$480/month more than the average Marine Corps officer when you add Special and 
Incentive (S&I) payments. This leads one to question whether or not they will be able to  
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meet their requirements for mid-career officers (Kapp, 2006) following the Navy’s force 
shaping experiment in Fiscal Year 2007 when the active duty end strength levels off to its 
steady state level of 345,000 sailors. 
Regardless of the Navy’s current manpower trends, the present scenario provides 
a glaring example of how the miscalculation of discount rates associated with 
government projects, coupled with a lack of foresight as it pertains to human behavior, 
can have a devastating effect on any program. Although there are no current studies 
readily available to assess the Fiscal Year 2005 (FY2006 promotion boards) spike in non-
selections for officer promotions, one could assume that the specter of another round of 
voluntary separations payments may have encouraged numerous officers to avoid their 
professional military education (PME) requirements or meet the minimum standard. Of 
course, we will not know the answer to that question until the data becomes available, but 
this would be an interesting topic for further research. 
In the meantime, the Department of the Navy needs to find a better way to 
evaluate its incentive pay system and the determination of the discount rates they 
associate with these programs. Following the national surge in patriotism in the United 
States after the events of 9/11 and the overwhelming success of the race to Baghdad, it 
did seem that Navy would have to pay a hefty price to entice junior officers to leave. 
However, with the prospects of longer deployments and increased chances of being 
placed in harm’s way, the All-Volunteer Force of sailors who jumped aboard for the 
education benefits and technical skills that would jumpstart their post-military careers 
now seem to be jumping ship (Kapp, 2005).  
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Even though it appears that the Navy may have missed its mark with the Targeted 
Separation Incentive program, this program serves as a perfect example of many of the 
problem areas associated with the delivery of incentive payments and forecast modeling 
as they relate to manpower issues in the military. First of all, when the Navy was looking 
to offer a voluntary separation payment to sailors in order to meet its reduction goals, it 




order to affect an income transfer in support of future acquisitions. This seemed to be the 
perfect strategy for modernizing the Navy as envisioned under Admiral Clark’s Sea 
Power 21 vision statement. 
However, as the socio-political landscape quickly took a turn both here and 
abroad, many of the assumptions which led to the decision to re-administer voluntary 
separation payments quickly dissolved. As seen in Figure 5 below, the Programming, 
Planning, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) which replaced the six-year 
Programming, Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle, falls on a four-year cycle to 
allocate discretionary spending designed to fund the Department of Defense’s policy 
decisions. As mentioned above, at the time of the birth of the Targeted Separation 
Incentive program, the Navy had the daunting task of getting rid of all these patriotic 
people. Seeing that the Department of Defense seems to have a harder time trying to fire 




Figure 5.   Summary of PPBE Cycle 
Source: Secretary of Defense Management Decision 913, 2003:3. 
And, under most circumstances, except for the one which actually occurred, the 
most likely answer would have been the Targeted Separation Incentive. This points to a 
tremendous flaw that is inherent in the way the Department of Defense budgets for future 
programs. As the future Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, David 
S. Chu stated in 1997: “future DoD strategy may require more flexibility in our human 
resources management system (Asch and Warner, 2001).”  Seeing the effects of a 
delayed budgeting program that executes policy four years after it is relevant only 
reinforces the idea that future incentive payments can be managed more effectively 





planned, it is easy to assume that there would have been an even greater outcry 
concerning the economic rents paid to our departing sailors than what occurred with the 
first drawdown.  
For this reason, the Department of the Navy should look at using auctions as the 
mechanism for accomplishing their future force shaping programs. Not only does an 
auction setting offer a medium which greatly reduces the surplus payments to departing 
sailors associated with prior programs, thus yielding a more cost-effective product, but, 
an auction can serve as a more graphic substitute for the endless surveys the Department 
of Defense conducts to determine the current state of the fleet. Furthermore, auctions 
could be used to deliver re-enlistment and special pay incentives, as well.  
Through the use of an auction system, the Department of the Navy can capture 
real data as it pertains to a specific program vice simply guessing at the appropriate 
discount rate to use. In addition, the auction system would allow policy analysts to gain a 
clearer perspective on just how the service member views his or her military 
compensation package, which continues to be a difficult factor for both the sailor and the 
policy maker to grasp. However, most important, the auction would serve as a true gauge 
of what type of incentive it would take the average sailor to stay or to leave. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
With the end of the Department of the Navy’s latest force reduction drawing near, 
it is apparent that the Targeted Separation Incentive program will prove to be a very 
effective tool in meeting the Navy’s steady state goal. While the total opportunity cost of 
this program still remains debatable, the aftermath of this program will serve as a 
valuable area for further research for the Department of Defense when all the numbers 
are in and the analysts can evaluate this program’s true role. In the meantime, the Navy 
should start looking at recent trends in retention to ensure that they did not over shoot the 
bow with the Targeted Separation Incentive program and that the future force will be able 
to “guide our Navy as we defend our nation and defeat our enemies in the uncertain 
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APPENDIX A.  FY2006 PAY CHARTS 
 
(Source:  DFAS Website: 
[http://www.dod.mil/dfas/militarypay/newinformation/WebPayTableVersion2006updated
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APPENDIX D.  DECISION TREE FOR PROMOTION AND 
RETENTION PROBABILITIES FOR AN O-3 
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INVOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS PAY FOR FY2006    
Paygrade  6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Commissioned officers    
O-5 $38,761.20 $45,221.40 $52,871.04 $59,479.92 $69,350.40 $76,285.44 $86,093.28 
O-4 $34,920.72 $40,740.84 $49,265.28 $55,423.44 $65,786.40 $72,365.04 $82,883.52 
O-3 $32,421.60 $37,825.20 $45,397.44 $51,072.12 $58,503.60 $64,353.96 $73,668.96 




Accessed: 16 February 2006) 
 
MAXIMUM COST TO SEPARATE UNDER FY2006 NDAA    
        
Paygrade 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
O-3 $64,843.20 $75,650.40 $90,794.88 $102,144.24 $117,007.20 $128,707.92 $147,337.92 
O-2 $55,468.80 $64,713.60 $73,958.40 $83,203.20 $92,448.00 $101,692.80 $110,937.60 
O-3E $64,843.20 $75,650.40 $90,794.88 $102,144.24 $117,007.20 $128,707.92 $147,337.92 
O-2E $55,468.80 $64,713.60 $76,314.24 $85,853.52 $100,353.60 $110,388.96 $125,038.08 
O-1E $46,746.72 $54,537.84 $64,627.20 $72,705.60 $83,728.80 $92,101.68 $103,947.84 
        
        
NDAA MAX COST TO SEPARATE - SENATE     
        
Paygrade 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
O-3 $97,264.80 $113,475.60 $136,192.32 $153,216.36 $175,510.80 $193,061.88 $221,006.88 
O-2 $83,203.20 $97,070.40 $110,937.60 $124,804.80 $138,672.00 $152,539.20 $166,406.40 
O-3E $97,264.80 $113,475.60 $136,192.32 $153,216.36 $175,510.80 $193,061.88 $221,006.88 
O-2E $83,203.20 $97,070.40 $114,471.36 $128,780.28 $150,530.40 $165,583.44 $187,557.12 
O-1E $70,120.08 $81,806.76 $96,940.80 $109,058.40 $125,593.20 $138,152.52 $155,921.76 
        
        
NDAA MAX COST TO SEPARATE - ORIGINAL HOUSE PLAN    
        
Paygrade 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
O-3 $129,686.40 $151,300.80 $181,589.76 $204,288.48 $234,014.40 $257,415.84 $294,675.84 
O-2 $110,937.60 $129,427.20 $147,916.80 $166,406.40 $184,896.00 $203,385.60 $221,875.20 
O-3E $129,686.40 $151,300.80 $181,589.76 $204,288.48 $234,014.40 $257,415.84 $294,675.84 
O-2E $110,937.60 $129,427.20 $152,628.48 $171,707.04 $200,707.20 $220,777.92 $250,076.16 
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